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Abstract 
 
Over the last two decades MENA countries as much of the developing countries have 
experienced a wave of liberalization of financial sector. There have been expectations that 
financial liberalization would enhance economic growth by stimulating saving and 
investment. The purpose of this paper is three folds. First, to review the literature on the 
rationale for financial repression. Second, to examine the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the links between financial liberalization, savings and investment. Third, to 
assess empirically the effect of financial reforms on economic performance in the specific 
case of MENA countries. For data availability reasons, our investigation focuses on a 
sample of five MENA countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) over the 
period 1970-1998. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades MENA countries as much of the developing countries have 
experienced a wave of liberalization of financial sector. For a long time, the primary task 
of financial system has been to finance the government needs, public enterprises, and 
priority sectors through mandatory holding of treasury bills and bonds issued by 
development banks.  
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Since mid 1980s, a gradual liberalization of financial system has taken place. Interest 
rates subsidies to priority sectors have been reduced or eliminated. The monetary 
authorities started to manage liquidity through a more active use of reserve requirements 
and a more market-based allocation of refinancing. Stock markets legislation has been 
updated, and their management was transferred to the association of brokerage houses. 
New banking law increased autonomy of the central bank and introduced prudential 
regulation in line with international standards. Finally, measures to increase competition 
by opening banks' capital to foreign participation have been designed. 
 
There have been expectations that financial liberalization would enhance economic 
growth by stimulating saving and investment.  
 
The purpose of this paper is three folds. First, to review the literature on the rationale for 
financial repression. Second, to examine the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
links between financial liberalization, savings and investment. Third, to assess 
empirically the effect of financial reforms on economic performance in the specific case 
of MENA countries.  
 
The empirical assessment attempts to capture the effects of both banking sector and stock 
market developments. For data availability reasons, our investigation focuses on a sample 
of five MENA countries (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) over the period 
1970-1998.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The second section examines why 
governments adopt financial repression policies. The third section reviews the theoretical 
and empirical findings on how financial liberalization could affect savings, investment 
and growth. The fourth section addresses the impact of financial liberalization on 
economic performance in the specific context of MENA countries, and finally section 
five concludes.   3 
 
2.  Why do governments adopt financial repression policies? 
 
Whether the degree of financial development is crucial or not for economic growth is a 
very debatable issue among economists. Lucas (1988) asserts that economists tend to 
over-stress the role of financial factors in economic growth. In contrast, a large literature 
on development states that the extent of financial intermediation in an economy is crucial 
for its growth (MacKinnon (1973), Goldsmith (1969), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), 
Levine (1997)). For the latter view, the argument is that by reallocating capital to the 
highest return projects and dealing with moral hazard, adverse selection and transaction 
costs problems, financial intermediaries represent a n essential catalyst for economic 
growth. So, Why do governments adopt financial repression policies? 
 
Financial repression is the result of nominal interest rate ceiling that is below the 
prevailing rate of inflation and currency depreciation. Under financial repression regime, 
the monetary authorities impose high reserve requirements, bank-specific credit ceilings 
and selective credit allocation, mandatory holding of treasury bills and bonds issued by 
the government, and finally a non-competitive and segmented financial system.  
 
Theoretically, there are several arguments in favor of financial repression. First, it allows 
the authorities to have a better control over the money supply. Second, the government is 
assumed to know better than the markets what investments are more desirable from a 
social perspective. Third, the government should protect lenders against usury practices 
by moderating the free determination of interest rates. Finally, financial repression is 
usually accompanied by interest rates below market rates, which reduces the costs of 
servicing government debts (Giovannini and De Melo (1993), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995)).  
 
Giovannini and De Melo (1993) emphasize the fact that financial repression is a taxation 
device used to finance the government needs at artificially low interest rates. They 
provide empirical evidence on the interactions between financial controls and tax policies 
(budgetary impact of financial repression) by estimating the amount of revenue that 
governments in developing countries have obtained from financial repression. Their 
empirical evidence covered 24 countries over the 1972-1987 period.    4 
 
The government revenue directly arising from financial repression can be measured as the 
difference between foreign and domestic interest rates, times the stock of domestic 
government liabilities.  
 
The results show that revenue from financial repression as a share of GDP has ranged 
from 0 in Indonesia, where domestic government debt is held exclusively by the central 
bank, to 6 percent in Mexico and Zimbabwe. In Algeria it represents 4.3 percent, 2.31 
percent in Morocco, 2.2 percent in Turkey, 1.5 percent in Tunisia and 0.6 percent in 
Jordan. Giovannini and De Melo (1993) report the two components through which 
financial repression was implemented: the interest rate differentials and the changes in 
exchange rates. The sum of these two components is equivalent to a tax rate of financial 
repression. These components are respectively (8.49 and 1.59 for Algeria), (5.74 and 
10.33 for Morocco), (5.98 and 7.22 for Tunisia), (0.85 and 54.64 for Turkey) and finally 
(6.71 and 0.47 for Jordan). These results suggest that financial liberalization would 
generate a substantial budgetary problem unless it is accompanied by appropriate fiscal 
measures to substitute for the revenue loss.  
 
However, there are theoretical as well as empirical arguments that suggest that financial 
repression may exert adverse effects on economic growth. In such circumstances, it has 
been relevant to investigate the government's motivations to adopt such policy. According 
to Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1995) the main reason is that financial sector represents a 
potential source of "easy" resources for the public budget through the inflation tax. 
Financial development, which also means a reduction in the transaction costs of 
transforming non-liquid to liquid assets, reduces the need to hold money. Therefore, 
financial development decreases the inflation tax-base and the possibilities to collect 
seigniorage. Therefore, tax system reforms aiming at reducing the need for seigniorage 
revenues have been stressed as a priority in structural adjustment programs before 
implementing financial liberalization reforms. 
 
To the extent that financial liberalization increases the efficiency of allocating savings to 
productive investment, financial repression will also have negative real effects.    5 
 
3.  Financial liberalization, savings, investment and growth 
 
The financial system affects capital accumulation either by increasing saving rate (level 
effect) or by improving the allocation of savings among potential investors (reallocation 
effect). The availability of funds may also affect economic growth by financing 
technological innovation. 
 
3.1.  Theoretical review 
 
In an extensive survey, Levine (1997) breaks the primary function of financial sector into 
five basic functions: mobilization of saving, allocation of resources, hedging and pooling 
risks, easing exchange of goods and services, monitoring managers and exerting 
corporate control. Informational asymmetries and transaction costs create incentives for 
the emergence of financial markets that supply financial instruments. Banks can offer 
liquid deposits to savers and undertake a mixture of liquid low-return investments to 
satisfy demands on deposits and illiquid high-return investments. In doing so, banks 
provide complete insurance to savers against liquidity risk while facilitating long-run 
investments. The ability of banks and security markets to pool risk across individual 
projects, industries and regions is also crucial for economic growth. By facilitating risk 
diversification, financial markets induce a portfolio risk toward projects with high-
expected returns. 
 
In their paper, Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) argue that the strong assertions for the 
positive effects of financial liberalization on economic growth tend not to be supported 
by the evidence. To support their claim, they reconsider the conventional theoretical 
propositions and empirical facts against financial repression.  
 
First, the relationship between real deposit rates and saving rate: Although there is a 
strong belief that higher interest rates would stimulate saving, the offsetting income and 
substitution effects of increased interest rates mean an ambiguous total effect on saving. 
In developing countries, the lack of appropriate data and their poor quality make it harder 
to provide any evidence. Second, the relationship between financial depth and growth is 
not strong and varies substantially across countries.    6 
 
Levine (1991) derives a model where more liquid stock markets- markets where it is less 
expensive to trade equities- stimulate long-run investment projects because investors can 
easily sell their stake if they need liquidity before the project matures. He concludes that 
high liquid stock market attracts investment in long-run high-return projects that boost 
productivity growth.  
 
Mauro (1995) starts from the documented fact that Japan and continental Europe have 
experienced high saving rates and fast growth even though their stock markets have been 
relatively underdeveloped, while US and UK have been characterized by low saving and 
slower growth even though their stock markets have been well developed. To 
accommodate these facts, he incorporates some results from precautionary saving 
literature into an endogenous growth model in which the young and the old share the 
output produced by their "family business". This model suggests that the existence of a 
stock market where investors can pool their risks is expected to reduce precautionary 
saving and- in a closed economy- investment and growth. The paper shows that if 
uncertainty is of a multiplicative nature and utility across states is CRRA (constant 
relative risk aversion), then the mechanism will decrease savings and tend to lower 
growth if and only if the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is below one. 
 
However, there is a theoretical debate on whether high stock market liquidity improves 
saving rates. In fact, higher returns and better risk sharing may reduce saving. 
Furthermore, since more liquidity makes it easier to sell shares, it may reduces the 
incentives of shareholders to monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) and weaker 
corporate governance limit the effective resource allocation and affects economic growth.  
 
Regarding the reallocation and productivity effects of financial deepening, Greenwood 
and Jovanovic (1990) develop a model where the extent of financial intermediation and 
economic growth are endogenously determined. In their model, financial intermediaries 
can invest more productively than individuals because of their better ability to identify 
investment opportunities. They conclude that financial intermediation promotes growth 
because it allows a higher rate of returns to be earned on capital, and growth in turn 
provides the means to implement costly financial structures. 
Concerning the role that the stock market plays in allowing investors to diversify their 
portfolios to hedge against idiosyncratic risk, Levine (1991) constructs an endogenous   7 
growth model in which stock market emerges to help agents to cope with liquidity risk 
and investigate how the stock market affects investment incentives in ways that change 
steady-state growth rates. He shows that the existence of a stock market affects positively 
economic growth and may stimulate high return, and more productive projects rather than 
safe storage of wealth. This paper also shows that taxing financial market activities 
lowers per capita growth rates. 
 
3.2.  Empirical review 
 
To date the empirical relationship between financial system development and saving, 
investment and economic growth has been difficult to test. Two streams of research may 
be distinguished. The first investigates more generally the relationships between financial 
development indicators and economic performance (King and Levine (1993), Atje and 
Jovanovic (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998 a), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Harris (1997). 
The second focuses more specifically on the impact of financial liberalization on 
economic performance (Bayoumi (1993), Henry (2000), Kim and Singal (2000), Bekaert 
and Harvey (2000)).  
 
King and Levine (1993), examine whether higher level of financial development are 
positively associated with economic development using data over 80 countries from 1969 
through 1989. Four indicators have been constructed in order to measure financial 
development. First, the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Second, the importance of 
deposit banks relative to the central bank in allocating credit. Third, the share of credit 
issued to non-financial institutions (in total credit and in GDP). Using this array of 
indicators provide much better picture of financial depth than using a single indicator. 
Using cross-country regressions and after controlling for a set of country and policy 
characteristics, they find that higher levels of financial development are positively 
associated with faster rates of economic growth and physical capital accumulation. They 
also point out that financial development is a good predictor for long-run economic 
growth over the next 10 to 30 years. These finding confirm that finance does not only 
follow economic activity and that the strong correlation between the level of financial 
depth and economic growth does not simply reflect a positive association between 
contemporaneous shocks to both financial and economic development.  
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Atje and Jovanovic (1993) present a cross-country study of stock markets and economic 
growth over the period 1980-88. They find a significant correlation between average 
economic growth and stock market capitalization for 40 countries.  
 
Levine and Zervos (1998 a.) study whether stock markets and banks promote economic 
growth. This paper extends that of Atje and Jovanovic (1993) in different dimensions; by 
enlarging the sample size and the time coverage, by using different measures of stock 
market development, and by controlling for other economic and political factors that may 
affect economic growth). Using data on 47 countries from 1976 through 1993, they find 
that measures  of stock market liquidity are strongly related to growth, capital 
accumulation, and productivity. Surprisingly, stock market size does not seem to be 
robustly correlated to economic growth. Conversely, bank lending to the private sector 
has a strong effect on economic growth.  
 
However, as indicated by Rajan and Zingales (1998), one may be still skeptical about the 
causality direction between financial development and economic growth. Specifically, 
financial institutions may tend to lend more if they expect future economic growth and 
the stock market capitalizes the present value of growth opportunities. In this case, 
financial development can be viewed as a leading indicator rather than a causal factor. To 
overcome these issues, they suggest to investigate microeconomic data on firms' external 
finance. Using data at the industry level over the period 1980-90, their findings indicate 
that ex-ante development of financial markets facilitates the ex post growth of sectors 
dependent on external finance. 
 
Harris  (1997) re-examines the empirical relationship between stock markets and 
economic growth using more appropriate instruments for investment and applying more 
advanced econometric techniques. In contrast to Atje and Jovanovic (1993), he finds no 
hard evidence that the level of stock market activity helps to explain growth in par capita 
output. Splitting the sample leads to the similar results for the sub-sample of less 
developed countries. In the sub-sample of developed countries, however, the level of 
stock market activity helps to explain per capita growth but by less than half the value 
predicted by Atje and Jovanovic for their whole sample. 
 
Bayoumi (1993) investigates the interaction between financial deregulation and 
household saving's behavior using regional data for UK in the 1980s. He concluded that   9 
financial deregulation was responsible for lowering the equilibrium level of saving by 
roughly 2.25 percent per year and making saving more dependent on changes in wealth, 
income and interest rates.  
 
Henry (2000) examines the relationship between stock market liberalization (the decision 
to allow foreigners to purchase shares in the country's stock market) and the growth of 
real private investment using an event study approach on sample of developing countries. 
Henry's paper covers 11 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Korea, 
Malaysia, The Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela). Standard models of international 
asset pricing predict that stock market liberalization may reduce the liberalizing country's 
cost of equity capital. This fall in the cost of equity will transform some investment 
project that had a negative (NPV) before liberalization into positive NPV after 
liberalization. Data indicate than on average countries experience large, temporary 
increase in the growth rate of real private investment on the heels of stock market 
liberalization in the eleven countries. The relationship between private investment growth 
and stock market liberalization persist after controlling for world business cycle effects, 
contemporaneous economic reforms and domestic fundamentals. However, Henry cannot 
conclude that stock market liberalization cause investment booms, because the possibility 
of reverse causality cannot be ruled out. 
 
The evidence finds by Kim and Singal (2000), and Bekaert and Harvey (2000) support 
the fact that stock market liberalization causes a one-time revaluation of emerging market 
stock prices and a fall in the cost of capital.  
 
Why a country's cost of equity falls after financial liberalization? There are two 
components in the cost of capital: the equity premium and the risk free rate. Stock market 
liberalization is expected to increase net capital inflows and this "supply effect" could 
reduce risk free rate. Second, more risk sharing between foreign and domestic residents 
should reduce equity premium. Increased capital inflows may also increase stock market 
liquidity, and increased liquidity reduces the equity premium. (Levine and Zervos 1998 
b.). But, financial liberalization does not always lead to a fall in the cost of equity capital. 
It could increase risk-free rate. This depends on whether the liberalization of restrictions 
on inflows is accompanied by a liberalization of restrictions on outflows. It also depends 
on whether the autarky risk-free rate (before liberalization) was above or below the world   10 
rate. Ultimately, whether a country's cost of capital rises or falls following stock market 
liberalization is an empirical question that must be considered case by case. 
4.  Empirical investigation 
 
In this section we investigate the relationship between financial intermediation and 
growth. As our literature review pointed out, economic agents rely on financial 
intermediaries to reduce information and transactions costs, to manage liquidity risk and 
allocate optimally investment. By doing so, financial intermediaries influence saving and 
investment decisions and hence may affect overall economic growth. Our purpose is to 
assess the existence of this effect and test the theoretical predictions regarding the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth in the specific case of 
selected MENA countries. 
 
4.1  Data sources and indicators 
 
a.  How to capture financial liberalization 
 
Financial liberalization reforms involve usually several key phases that are implemented 
in several years. These reforms cover interest rates, reserves requirements, credit 
allocation, bank ownership, pro-competition measures, security markets, prudential 
regulation, and openness of capital account (Bandiera et al. 2000).  
 
This process of financial liberalization has generally proceeded in many stages and the 
relaxation of different controls has been rarely simultaneous. From this point of view, it is 
difficult to define a single date in which liberalization has taken place. Moreover, official 
and practical timing of any particular relaxation often don't coincide. There have also 
been partial reversals of prior liberalization in some countries.  
 
One can try to infer the timing of liberalization from the statistical properties of interest 
rate data themselves or other financial indicators (liquid liabilities as a share of GDP, 
deposit money bank assets to total financial assets, credit by deposit money banks to 
private sector as a share of total credit or GDP).  
   11 
Following Bandiera et al. (2000), this paper construct a financial liberalization index that 
captures the exogenous changes in eight items (interest rate regulation, reserves 
requirements, credit allocation, bank ownership, pro-competition measures,  security 
markets, prudential regulation, and capital account liberalization). For each item a 
dummy variable that takes 1 for a more liberalized regime and 0 otherwise is created. 
Using the principal component analysis, a weighted average of the more important 
principal components is computed. This indicator represents the financial liberalization 
index that will be used in the regression analysis. To this end, IMF country reports have 
been explored in order to construct database records of such policy changes.  
 
b.  Financial depth measures  
 
Assuming that the size of the formal financial intermediary sector relative to economic 
activity reveals the extent and the quality of financial services, many researchers use 
liquid liabilities over GDP (LL/GDP) as a proxy for financial development. However, this 
indicator reflects the overall size of financial sector and does not distinguish between the 
allocation of capital to private sector and to various governmental and quasi-
governmental agencies. In this respect, it may not inform reliably on the extent to which 
financial services such as risk management and information processing are provided. 
Data on this indicator are presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1 (About here) 
 
In order to assess more accurately the contribution  of commercial banks in financial 
intermediation, the ratio of deposit money bank domestic assets to total financial assets 
(deposit money bank domestic assets and central bank domestic assets) Denoted by 
BANK. The rationale for this measure is that banks are more likely to identify profitable 
investment, monitor managers, mobilize savings than central banks (Levine 1997). The 
weakness of this indicator is that in some countries, the government influence the 
structure of bank assets and liabilities through mandatory holdings, and controls on credit 
allocation. Table 2 presents data on this indicator.  
 
Table 2 About Here 
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A more accurate indicator of financial development is provided by the value of credits by 
financial intermediaries to the private sector (excluding credit to money banks) divided 
by total domestic credit. The last indicator is computed as the ratio of claims on the 
financial private sector to GDP. Table 3 and 4 present, respectively data on these two last 
indicators. 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 
 
4.2  Econometric analysis 
 
The econometric analysis is based on three main specifications involving three dependent 
variables (private saving, private investment and real GDP growth rate). In the first two 
specifications, the variables are entered in the logarithmic terms, except for real interest 
rate (RR) due to the presence of negative values. One advantage of the logarithmic 
transformation is that the regressions directly yield elasticity coefficients of private saving 
rate and private investment rate respectively with respect to explanatory variables, 
making it readily possible to assess the economic relevance of the relationship. The 
logarithm transformation also accounts for potential non-linearities in the relationship 
between the dependent and the explanatory variables. It is very likely, for example, that 
the effects of financial depth private investment are minimal at low levels of financial 
depth and increase as the country's financial system develops. 
 
The equations are estimated using panel data approach and more specifically by allowing 
for each of the five countries to have its own intercept (fixed-effects estimation). An F-
test rejects significantly the hypothesis of a common intercept and supports the alternative 
of individual country intercepts.  
 
To test the effects of financial liberalization on private saving, private investment and 
growth, various indicators of the extent of financial reforms are used alternatively. First, 
the four classical indicators of financial depth (total liquid liabilities of financial 
intermediaries as a percentage of GDP (LLY), deposit money banks assets as a share of 
total assets (BANK), private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (PRIVY), and private 
credit by deposit money banks to total domestic credit (PRIV)) are used to proxy 
indirectly for the scope of financial liberalization. In a second step, financial liberalization 
index (FINX) constructed on the basis of available information on the eight main   13 
dimensions of financial reforms is used. The results are presented in table 5 for private 
saving, table 6 for private investment, and table 7 for real GDP growth rate. To avoid 
omitting variables bias, different policy-related variables such as trade openness, 
exchange rate overvaluation, inflation rate and real interest rate are included into the 
regressions. 
 
Different tests are conducted to examine the ways in which financial depth affects private 
saving, private investment, and economic growth and also to check the robustness of the 
estimated results.  
 
a.  Financial liberalization and private saving 
 
Estimation results on the impact of financial liberalization on private saving using each of 
the five measures of the extent of financial development are shown in table 5. While there 
are theoretical reasons that suggest that each of the included variables contribute in 




The coefficients on all five financial indicators are negative although only two of them 
are statistically significant at 95 percent level of confidence (LLY and FINX). The results 
support the hypothesis that an increase in financial depth leads to a lower level of private 
saving. The coefficients indicate elasticities of private saving with respect to those 
financial depth indicators since the regression variables are in logarithm. The first column 
of the table suggests that a 1% increase in liquid liabilities as a share of GDP leads 
roughly to 0.37% decline in private saving. The elasticities of private saving with respect 
to credit issued to the private sector (as a share of GDP or as a share of total domestic 
credit) are invariably equal to (-0.13). A similar result is obtained when using deposit 
money bank assets to total financial assets as measure of financial  development. Finally, 
the elasticity of private saving with respect to the composite index of financial 
liberalization is in the middle range ( -0.20). The negative impact of financial 
development in general and financial liberalization more specifically on saving suggests 
that liberalization may have relaxed credit constraints on households. Japelli and Pagano 
(1994) found the same result in a cross-country study. They argue that easing liquidity   14 
constraints on households by liberalizing consumer and mortgage credits, financial 
deregulation leads to a decline in saving rate and economic growth. 
 
As noted in our literature review, the real interest rate can have a positive or negative 
effect on savings, depending on the relative magnitudes of substitution and income 
effects. The evidence is also less clear as shown by the coefficients reported in table 5. 
The estimates are positive, which suggests that higher real interest rates stimulate saving 
behavior of private agents, but they are not statistically significant. 
 
Theoretically, in a closed economy the effect of economic growth on private saving is 
positive, but in a small open economy it becomes ambiguous; faster growth may reduce 
the saving rate by stimulating the consumption of the young (Jappelli and Pagano 1994). 
According to our estimation, the coefficient of economic growth is positive, statistically 
significant and quite robust across the five measures of financial development. It reveals a 
positive relationship between economic growth and private saving. This result tends to 
corroborates previous finding in the literature. A potential endogeneity bias may be 
suspected if growth is itself endogenous and positively correlated with error term of the 
private saving equation. To account for this potential bias, the contemporaneous growth 
rate of GDP was replaced by the growth rate in the previous period. This specification 
yields results similar to those reported in table 5. As expected, a higher dependency ratio
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increases family needs and puts more burden on workers, thereby reducing saving. This 
negative coefficient is consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis. That is, if a high 
proportion of the population are not of working age, then the dissaving patterns of this 
segment of the population will outweigh the saving patterns of the working cohort. The 
magnitude of the effect, however, does not seem to be statistically robust and vary 
depending on the financial depth indicator. 
 
The Budget deficit as a share of GDP may affect private savings if economic agents are 
Ricardian and use private savings to offset changes in government savings. The negative 
and significant coefficient of the government budget surplus, in four out of five 
regressions, is consistent with Ricardian-like behavior. Finally, the results indicate a 
positive but insignificant coefficient on external debt as a ratio of GDP. 
 
b. Financial liberalization and private investment   15 
 
Theoretically, financial liberalization is associated with a better allocation of capital and 
more efficient transformation of saving into investment. By mitigating the liquidity 
constraints faced by entrepreneurs and reducing transactions costs of converting illiquid 
to liquid assets, a more liberalized financial system should stimulates capital 
accumulation and have positive effect on economic growth.  
 
To test the effects of financial development on private investment, the same methodology 
applied previously for private saving is adopted. The results are reported in table 6. The 
results seem to be surprising with regard the theoretical expectations. The coefficients on 
financial development indicators as well as on financial liberalization index indicate a 
negative impact of financial depth on private investment in the five MENA countries 
investigated. This finding is inconsistent with the previous literature using cross-country 
regressions. Levine (1993), for example, using a cross-section of 77 countries over the 
period 60-89 found a positive effect of financial development indicator on real per capita 
capital growth. 
 
One potential explanation of our result can be found in the link between financial 
development and the development of mortgage and consumer credit markets. By 
distorting private credit allocation in favor of households at the extent of lending to firms, 
financial liberalization not only have reduced private savings but tended also to reduce 
available loans for business sector. To assess the validity of this explanation one needs 
detailed data on the allocation of private credit between households and firms. A 
complete characterization of the allocation of private credit (by sector, by maturity) is 
extremely useful to investigate the extent to which financial liberalization resulted in an 
effective increase in the flow of funds attributed to private investment. For data 




The coefficient of real interest rate is positive in three cases out of five, although only 
significant when liquid liabilities as a share of GDP is used a measure of financial 
development. In the two other cases, real interest rate has a negative but insignificant 
coefficient. The positive sign on real interest rate contradicts the theoretical prediction 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
2 The ratio of (the population under fifteen + the population over 60) to the total population.    16 
according to which a higher cost of capital would discourage private investment. This 
result may reflect the uncertainty with regard the future inflation since investment 
decisions are taken on ex-ante basis while real interest rate used here is the ex-post 
measure of the borrowing cost.  
 
The coefficient of economic growth is positive, statistically significant and quite robust 
across the five measures of financial development. This result implies a positive 
relationship between economic growth and private investment. To ensure that this result 
is not biased by the potential positive correlation of economic growth with error term of 
the private investment equation, the contemporaneous real GDP growth rate is replaced 
with real GDP growth rate in the previous year. 
 
To account for the effect of government policies on private investment, four variables 
were included into the private investment equation: the extent of trade openness, the rate 
of inflation, the degree of overvaluation of real exchange rate, and the extent of the 
government budget surplus as a share of GDP. The first variable has the expected positive 
sign, highly significant and statistically robust, implying that trade openness exerts a 
positive effect on private investment. The second and the third variables have the 
predicted negative sign, although only m arginally significant. This negative sign is 
consistent with the damaging effect of uncertainty of macroeconomic environment on 
private investors' decisions. The fourth variable exhibit insignificant coefficients, 
although one may expect government borrowing in order to finance budget deficit to be 
harmful for private investment.   17 
 
c. Financial liberalization and economic growth 
 
The theoretical underpinning of the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth has recently received considerable attention in both theoretical and 
empirical research. The channels through which financial development could affect 
economic growth have already been presented in our literature review. The purpose here 
is to assess the relative contribution of financial factors using the framework provided by 
the recent empirical growth literature. 
 
The estimated growth equation relates real GDP growth to a set of measures of financial 
depth, real interest rate and a set of control variables consisting of private investment rate, 
human capital indicator, trade openness, inflation rate, external debt as a share of GDP, 
annual change of terms of trade and real exchange rate overvaluation. The estimation 




The first striking feature of our results is the negative and insignificant coefficients on 
financial depth indicators (except for private credit as a share of GDP). This results 
contradict those of King and Levine (1993) who found positive association between 
financial system development and economic growth in a cross-country context. Our 
results provide evidence that once fundamental variables such as private investment and 
human capital (proxied by the secondary enrollment rate), and policy related variables 
such trade openness, inflation rate and the burden of external debt are controlled for, 
financial depth indicators fail to explain growth experience in the five MENA countries 
under investigation. These finding indicates the existence of interactions among variables 
that cause some of them to lose significance when they are include simultaneously. One 
channel of interaction presented earlier is through the effect of financial depth on private 
investment. The second striking feature is the positive, significant and robust coefficient 
of real interest rate. The ex-post determination of real interest rate and the uncertainty 
surrounding the prediction of inflation rate ex-ante may be an explanation of this finding. 
 
The remaining results presented in table 7 show that the coefficient estimate on lagged 
GDP, which stands for the catch-up term, is negative and significant. The coefficients on   18 
private investment and on human capital are positive and significant which is consistent 
with our expectations and corroborate the previous literature. The coefficient estimate of 
external debt as share of GDP is negative and statistically robust which indicates that the 
burden of external debt has contributed negatively to the observed slow growth in MENA 
countries. Debt obligations absorb an important fraction of resources that could be 
mobilized for investment purposes. The results on the other variables need to be 
interpreted with extreme cautious due to the potential heterogeneity in growth patterns 
among the five countries. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Since mid 1980s, a gradual liberalization of financial system has taken place in MENA 
countries. Interest rates subsidies to priority sectors have been reduced or eliminated. The 
monetary authorities started to manage liquidity through a more active use of reserve 
requirements and a more market-based allocation of refinancing. New banking law 
increased autonomy of the central bank and introduced prudential regulation in line with 
international standards. Finally, measures to increase competition by opening banks' 
capital to foreign participation have been designed. There have been expectations that 
higher financial development would enhance economic growth through better 
mobilization of saving and more efficient allocation of capital.  
 
The aim of this paper is to assess the impact of financial development on private saving, 
on private investment and on economic growth. While our results on the effects of 
financial development on private saving are overall expected and seem to be consistent 
with the previous studies. Our results on the relationship between financial development 
and private investment on one hand and financial development and economic growth on 
the other are rather disappointing with regard our initial expectations.  
 
The coefficients on financial development indicators as well as on financial liberalization 
index indicate a negative impact of financial depth on private investment in the five 
MENA countries investigated. This finding is inconsistent with the previous literature 
using cross-country regressions. One potential explanation of our result can be found in 
the link between financial development and the development of mortgage and consumer 
credit markets. By distorting private credit allocation in favor of households at the extent 
of lending to firms, financial liberalization may not only have reduced private savings but   19 
tended also to reduce available loans for business sector. To assess the validity of this 
explanation one needs detailed data on the a llocation of private credit between 
households and firms. Regarding the relationship between financial depth and economic 
growth, our results provide evidence that once fundamental variables such as private 
investment and human capital (proxied by the secondary enrollment rate), and policy 
related variables such trade openness, inflation rate and the burden of external debt are 
control for, financial depth indicators fail to explain growth experience in the five MENA 
countries under investigation. This is particularly plausible if financial liberalization have 
led to further distortion of credit allocation in favor of consumption and at the extent of 
productive activities.  
 
In order to investigate these issues in more depth, it would be worthwhile to undertake 
detailed analysis at the country level. Such analysis can take into account the effect of 
institutional differences and other country-specific developments. It can also capture the 
effect of private credit distribution between households and firms, among sectors, and 
between small and large firms. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. The Effects of Financial Liberalization Components on Savings 
Financial liberalization 
Component 
Direct effect  Effect on savings 
 
Interest rate liberalization 
 
Higher deposit interest rates 
(price-effect) 
 
Substitution and income effects, 
total effect on saving ambiguous 
 
Reduction of reserve 
requirements 
 
More resources available for 
lending (quantity-effect) may 
also lead to a price-effect. 
 
Net effect depends on other policy 
instruments (monetary policy: open 
market operations). 
 
Reduction of directed credit to 
priority sectors 
 
Reallocation within the 
business sector (high return 
projects) and more lending to 
households. 
 
Ambiguous effect on corporate 
saving and reduction of household 
saving. 
 
Bank ownership (more 
privatization) 
 
May be associated with an 
increase in lending to 
households.  
 




More risk taking in lending and 
reduction of bank spreads. 
Wider range of saving 
opportunities 
 




Offset or moderate risk taking 
promoted through competition. 
May also reduce upward 
pressure on deposit rates. 
 
Ambiguous effect on saving. 
 
Development of securities 
markets 
 
Wider and more flexible range 
of saving instruments. 
 
Can increase saving, the effect may 





Flows of foreign funds and 
increase in rates of returns as 
barriers to capital outflow are 
removed. 
 
Ambiguous effect on saving 
because banks can also borrow 
from abroad to sustain lending to 
local firms and households. 
This table is constructed from Bandiera et al. (2000) Does Financial reform raise or reduce 
saving? (The Review of Economics and Statistics, May 2000, 82(2): 239-263.   21 
Appendix 2. Financial Liberalization Components and Financial Liberalization Index (1) 
Financial liberalization 
Component 
Egypt  Jordan  Morocco  Tunisia  Turkey 
 
Interest rate liberalization 
1991: liberalization of interest 
rates (deposits and lending).  
  Interest rates on deposits 
liberalized in 90 and 91. 1996: 
Controls on lending and 
deposit rates completely 
eliminated  except a ban on 
remuneration of sight deposits 
and interest rates for small 
saving deposits.  
Most interest rates were 
liberalized in 1987, 1994 and 
1996. But some deposit rates 
remain regulated. (interest on 
sight deposits must not exceed 
a ceiling of 2 percentage 
points).  
1981: interest-rate ceiling 
abolished. 1983: Ceilings 
reintroduced. 1988: Ceiling 
eliminated.  
 
Reduction of reserve requirements 
Proxy by total reserves as a share of total deposit money bank assets. 
 
Reduction of directed credit to 
priority sectors 
1994: credit ceiling for private 
sector abolished. 1995: credit 
ceiling for public sector 
abolished 
  From 1991 to 1993, mandatory 
holding were reduced. 
Obligatory holding of treasury 
papers reduced from 35% in 
1986 to 10% by-end 1996. 
1991: mandatory holding of 
treasury debt instruments was 
relaxed. 1994: abolition of the 
obligation for banks to 
subscribe and hold treasury 
bills. 
1996: Obligatory sectoral 
lending ratios abolished. 
 
 
Bank ownership (more 
privatization) 
1996: Privatization of public 
banks ownership in joint 
venture and private banks.  




1986: measures to enlarge the 
scope of activities for foreign 




    Since mid 80s: further 
competition by breaking down 
the compartmenta-lization of 
activities between development 
and commercial banks. 1993: 
the new banking law: full 
integration of development 
banks. 
 
  1981: Barriers to entry 
lowered. 
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Appendix 3. Financial Liberalization Components and Financial Liberalization Index (2) 
Financial liberalization 
Component 
Egypt  Jordan  Morocco  Tunisia  Turkey 
 
Prudential regulation 
Prudential regulation applied 
progressively since 1991. 
(liquidity ratios, the capital 
adequacy ratio, the solvency 
criterion (Basle Accord). 1997: 
banks have to publish their 
audited financial statements in 
accordance with international 
standards.  
Prudential regulation applied 
since 1993. 
Prudential regulation 
introduced (to be met by 1996).  
 
1991: adoption of prudential 
regulations. 1993: external 
audits and off-site reporting 
requirements. 
1994:  amendments to the 
banking law. 
These requirements to be met 
in 1999. 
1986: new banking law 
becomes effective. It 
provides supervisory and 
prudential measures. 
 
Development of securities markets 
1992: measures to ensure stock 
market revival.  
  1993: stock market 
capitalization and turnover 
increased dramatically. 
1997: electronic quotation 
 
1994: stock market 
capitalization and turnover 
increased dramatically. 
1996: electronic quotations.  
1983: The capital market 
board is established to 
promote and monitor the 
securities markets. 1986: 
Istanbul Stock Exchange 
becomes operative.  
 
International financial liberalization 
1991: Liberalization of the 
exchange rate. All transactions 
in the balance of payments 
including the capital account, 
were fully liberalized (except 
investment in real estate).  
  1993: current account 
convertibility. Liberalization of 
inward foreign direct and 
portfolio investment, and 
external borrowing by 
residents. 
1996: Inter-bank FX market 
created. 
1996: A Moroccan bank issued 
equities in international capital 
markets and a private 
Moroccan enterprise issued 
corporate bonds in the 
European markets.  
1994: Inter-bank FX market 
created. 1997: Forward FX 
market established.  
1993: current account 
convertibility. Liberalization of 
inward foreign direct and 
portfolio investment, and 
external borrowing by 
residents.  
1994: Tunisian government 
issued long-term bonds on the 
Japanese capital market. 
1984: Foreign exchange 
(FX) deregulation. Banks 
are allowed to keep 
foreign currency abroad. 
1985: New restrictions 
introduced. 1988: FX 
liberalized. 1989: capital 
movements liberalized. 
1990: Exchange rate 
liberalized.    24 
Appendix4. Data Sources and Indicators
3 
Variable  Time span  Description 
Liquid Liabilities to GDP (LLY)  1970-1997  LL use IFS line 551 or if not available line 351 which is equal to 
M2. LL is a typical measure for financial depth but does 
distinguish between the financial sectors or between the use of 
liabilities. 
Deposit money bank assets to total 
financial assets (BANK) 
1970-1997  Deposit money bank domestic assets are from IFS lines (24+25). 
Total financial assets = IFS lines (12+22+42)  
Private credit by deposit money Banks to 
GDP (PRIVY) 
1970-1997  Credit issued to the private sector as opposed to credit issued to 
governments and public enterprises. IFS (32d+42d). 
Private credit by deposit money banks to 
total domestic credit (PRIV) 
1970-1997  Total domestic credit is from IFS (32+42) 
Reserves to total deposits money banks 
(RES) 
1970-1997  Total reserves are from IFS lines (20+40). 
Real interest rates (RR)  1970-1997  RR is the deposit interest rate (IFS line 60l) less the rate of 
inflation measured by GDP deflator (line 99bi p) or if not 
available CPI (line 64). When 60l is not available RR is 
computed from the lending rate (60p) less the spread (from 
World saving database) less inflation. 
Stock market capitalization to GDP 
(CAPY) 
1986-1997  The value of listed shares divided by GDP. 
Stock market total value traded to GDP 
(TRADY) 
1986-1997  The total shares traded on the stock market divided by GDP. 
Stock market turnover (total shares 
traded/market capitalization) (TURNV) 
1986-1997  The value of total shares traded to market capitalization. It 
measures the activity or liquidity of a stock market relative to its 
size.  
Net Interest rate Margin (NMG)  1990-97  The accounting value of a bank's net interest revenue as a share 
of its total assets. (from Beck et al. 1999). 
Overhead costs as a share of total assets 
(OVRCO) 
1990-97  The accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a share of its 
total assets (from Beck et al. 1999). 
Market structure (CONC)  1990-97  The ratio of the three largest banks' assets to total banking assets. 
(from Beck et al. 1999). 
Private saving rate (PSAVY)  1970-97  Private saving as a share of gross national disposable income 
(from World saving database: Loayza et al. 1998). 
Private investment rate (PINVY)  1970-97  Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators 
(for gross domestic investment); Pfeffermann et al. "Trends in 
Private Investment in Developing Countries: (for public 
investment and private investment) 
Growth (Grow)  1970-1997  Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. 
Exchange rate overvaluation (EXOV)  1970-1997  Computed from Real effective exchange rate index given by 
Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators. 
Trade openness (OPEN)  1970-1997  Total trade (imports+exports) as a share of GDP). Global 
Development Finance & World Development Indicators 
Inflation rate (P)  1970-1997  Computed from CPI (IFS line 64) 
Secondary enrollment (SECENR)  1970-1997   
Budget surplus as a share of GDP 
(BUDY) 
1970-1997   
Terms of trade (TOT )  1970-1997   
Share of population over 60 (OLD)  1970-1997   
Share of population under 15 (YOUNG)  1970-1997   
 
                                                                 
3 This appendix 4. describes the list of variables used in the paper to investigate the relationship between financial 
liberalization saving, investment and growth. It also presents data sources and the time span covered by available 
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Table 1. Liquid Liabilities to GDP 
  1970-79  1980-85  1986-91  1992-97 
Egypt  40.0  74.6  80.5  77.4 
Jordan  58.6  80.3  115.5  106.1 
Morocco  34.5  41.0  45.7  61.7 
Tunisia  34.7  40.1  47.5  44.7 
Turkey  19.4  19.3  22.0  24.0 
 
Table 2. Deposit Money Banks Assets to Total Financial Assets 
  1970-79  1980-85  1986-91  1992-97 
Egypt  56.2  50.3  52.9  68.0 
Jordan  70.1  78.4  71.8  73.0 
Morocco  50.2  48.8  42.8  61.6 
Tunisia  80.3  78.5  75.3  79.6 
Turkey  60.2  51.4  61.4  74.6 
 
Table 3. Private credit to Total Domestic credit 
  1970-79  1980-85  1986-91  1992-97 
Egypt  24.8  24.0  26.4  39.2 
Jordan  72.4  74.2  61.7  75.2 
Morocco  47.1  39.4  44.7  55.1 
Tunisia  84.6  87.4  87.2  93.8 
Turkey  56.3  45.4  52.8  62.5 
 
Table 4. Private Credit by Deposit Banks to GDP 
  1970-79  1980-85  1986-91  1992-97 
Egypt  14.3  22.3  25.6  27.5 
Jordan  33.9  47.6  61.2  62.0 
Morocco  13.2  16.3  17.2  25.7 
Tunisia  …  …  51.6  50.5 
Turkey  …  …  13.4  13.5 
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Table 5. The impact of financial liberalization on private saving 
Explanatory variables  LLY  BANK  PRIVY  PRIV  FINX 
Financial depth  -0.37**  -0.13  -0.12  -0.13  -0.20** 
  (-2.12)  (-1.20)  (-1.55)  (-0.91)  (-3.23) 
Real interest rate   0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.003 
  (1.41)  (1.35)  (1.34)  (1.37)  (1.18) 
Real GDP Growth  0.005*  0.01**  0.008**  0.01**  0.01** 
  (1.75)  (3.50)  (2.31)  (3.58)  (2.03) 
Budget surplus/GDP  -0.03  -0.04**  -0.03**  -0.04**  -0.02* 
  (-1.44)  (-2.23)  (-2.13)  -2.34  (-1.92) 
Dependency ratio  -0.81*  -1.26*  -1.18**  -1.26**  -1.89** 
  (-1.72)  (-1.86)  (-2.06)  (-2.14)  (-4.63) 
External debt/GDP  -0.20  -0.35**  -0.31*  -0.37*  -0.18** 
  (-0.84)  (-1.94)  (-1.74)  (-1.90)  (-2.13) 
Adjusted R²  0.31  0.28  0.29  0.29  0.35 
F-statistic  5.72  5.19  5.31  5.29  7.26 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Observations  114  114  114  114  114 
Note: These estimations are obtained using country-fixed effect estimation over the period 1970-1997. The 
dependent variable is the private saving rate taking in logarithm. All regression variables are in logarithm, except for 
real GDP growth, real interest rate and budget surplus/GDP. The estimates are corrected for auto-correlation and 
heteroskedasticity (GLS estimation). The t-statistic are given in parentheses. LLY is the ratio of liquid liabilities 
over GDP. BANK is the deposit money banks assets as a share of total assets. PRIVY are private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP. PRIV is private credit by deposit money banks to total domestic credit. FINX is a financial 
liberalization index constructed on the basis of available information on the eight main dimensions of financial 
reforms implemented in the countries under study.  
 
Table 6. The impact of financial liberalization on private investment 
Explanatory variables  LLY  BANK  PRIVY  PRIV  FINX 
Financial depth  -0.58**  0.03  -0.16*  -0.19  -0.18* 
  (-2.62)  (0.14)  (-1.94)  (-1.24)  (-1.27) 
Real interest rate   0.02**  0.01  -0.008  -0.006  0.008 
  (3.20)  (1.44)  (-1.32)  (-0.89)  (1.21) 
Real GDP growth (t-1)  0.01*  0.01**  0.01**  0.02**  0.02** 
  (1.86)  (2.36)  (2.21)  (2.46)  (2.41) 
Trade openness  0.79**  0.54**  0.57**  0.77**  0.50** 
  (5.97)  (4.16)  (6.18)  (3.50)  (6.06) 
Inflation rate  -0.13*  -0.11  -0.13*  -0.10  -0.06 
  (-1.82)  (-1.31)  (-1.68)  (-1.19)  (-1.43) 
Exchange rate overvaluation  -0.006**  -0.003  -0.002  -0.001  -0.002 
  (-2.56)  (-1.53)  (-1.61)  (-0.92)  (-1.10) 
Budget surplus/GDP  0.01  0.00  0.005  -0.001  -0.004 
  (1.35)  (0.02)  (0.62)  (-0.09)  (-0.50) 
Adjusted R²  0.59  0.52  0.54  0.53  0.53 
F-statistic  16.59  13.72  14.63  13.95  14.27 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Observations  109  109  109  109  109 
Note: These estimations are obtained using country-fixed effect estimation over the period 1970-1997. The dependent 
variable is the private investment rate taking in logarithm. All regression variables are in logarithm, except for real 
GDP growth, real interest rate and budget surplus/GDP. The estimates are corrected for auto-correlation and 
heteroskedasticity (GLS estimation). The t-statistic are given in parentheses. LLY is the ratio of liquid liabilities over 
GDP. BANK is the deposit money banks assets as a share of total assets. PRIVY are private credit by deposit money 
banks to GDP. PRIV is private credit by deposit money banks to total domestic credit. FINX is a financial 
liberalization index constructed on the basis of available information on the eight main dimensions of financial 
reforms implemented in the countries under study.    28 
Table 7. The impact of financial liberalization on real GDP growth 
Explanatory variables  LLY  BANK  PRIVY  PRIV  FINX 
Financial development  -2.03  -1.96  -2.05*  -0.91  0.35 
  (-0.93)  (-0.97)  (-1.78)  (-0.68)  (0.17) 
Real interest rate  0.16**  0.15**  0.16**  0.15**  0.15** 
  (2.79)  (2.69)  (2.80)  (2.64)  (2.67) 
GDP (-1)  -2.65**  -2.60**  -2.79**  -2.57**  -2.65** 
  (-3.77)  (-3.73)  (-3.97)  (-3.70)  (-3.27) 
Private investment (t+1)  3.48**  3.88**  3.57**  3.86**  3.65** 
  (2.75)  (3.08)  (2.86)  (3.07)  (2.94) 
Human capital  4.31**  3.60**  3.86**  3.11**  3.16** 
  (2.48)  (2.54)  (2.78)  (2.24)  (2.19) 
Trade openness  1.62  1.87  1.69  1.93  2.19 
  (0.95)  (1.13)  (1.04)  (1.16)  (1.34) 
Inflation rate  0.88  1.24*  0.93  1.21*  1.31* 
  (1.16)  (1.89)  (1.41)  (1.84)  (1.95) 
External debt/GDP  -1.80  -2.75**  -2.11**  2.46**  -2.18** 
  (-1.47)  (-2.35)  (-1.98)  (-2.30)  (-2.07) 
Term of trade changes  0.62  0.22  1.1  0.72  0.35 
  (0.38)  (0.14)  (0.65)  (0.42)  (0.22) 
Exchange rate overvaluation  0.01  0.007  0.006  0.005  0.01 
  (1.23)  (0.71)  (0.62)  (0.49)  (0.82) 
Adjusted R²  0.34  0.35  0.36  0.34  0.33 
F-statistic  4.95  5.19  5.26  4.83  4.76 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Observations  127  127  127  127  127 
Note: These estimations are obtained using country-fixed effect estimation over the period 1970-1997. The 
dependent variable is real GDP growth rate. All explanatory variables are in logarithm, except for real interest rate. 
The estimates are corrected for auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity (GLS estimation). The t-statistic are given in 
parentheses. LLY is the ratio of liquid liabilities over GDP. BANK is the deposit money banks assets as a share of 
total assets. PRIVY are private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. PRIV is private credit by deposit money 
banks to total domestic credit. FINX is a financial liberalization index constructed on the basis of available 
information on the eight main dimensions of financial reforms implemented in the countries under study.  